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A Civil Rights Agenda for the Year 2000:
Confessions of an Identity Politician
FRANCES LEE ANSLEY*

Good morning. It is a pleasure and honor to be here today,' and
most especially a pleasure and honor to share the same platform
with Anita Hill. The topic for this symposium would be a daunting
one, even if it were not for her and the other illustrious company at
this table with me: "Civil Rights and the African-American Community: Setting the Agenda for the Year 2000."
I am not an African-American, and I will not be speaking to
you today from the perspective of the African-American community,
although I am firmly convinced that my own material and spiritual
well-being-and the material and spiritual well-being of my children,
and of each person sitting here in this room-is intimately bound up
with the well-being of that community. I will be speaking instead
from my own perspective and my own situation: that of a EuropeanAmerican, a female, someone of an age to have been imprinted in
a profound way by seeing in action the Jim Crow institutions of my
Southern childhood, imprinted in another profound way by seeing a
generation of black leaders, intellectuals, and ordinary citizens in
breathtaking motion around me, a feminist, a teacher of law students,
a person who has counted myself a part of legal and social struggles
for justice-for men and women of color, for women of all races,
and for people (of all races and both genders) whose economic
resources consist only of their increasingly uncertain ability to sell
their labor to others. I expect I will have less to say to and about

*
Associate Professor of Law, University of Tennessee College of Law.
A.B., 1969, Radcliffe-Harvard College; J.D., 1979, University of Tennessee College
of Law; LL.M., 1988, Harvard Law School.
1. The essay that follows is a slightly buffed and expanded version of a
talk given at West Virginia University in Morgantown, February 26, 1992, as part
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the African-American community than to and about the white community.
Finally, I come with few pat answers about what the civil rights
agenda for the year 2000 should be. I find myself alternately confused, enraged, inspired, dejected, and sometimes even hopeful
about
2
the situation presently confronting us civil rights partisans.
Now I need to pause for a moment and ask you to observe what
I just said: "us civil rights partisans." I have noticed that when
people use "we" or "us" or "our" or other such terms, it is
important to recognize just who it is they mean, who it is they seem
to be including and excluding, whether consciously or unconsciously,
in their circle. I have concluded that such noticing has value, whether
the person is the drafter of a constitution (remember "We the
people"?), or a President of the United States (remember "We are
not in a recession"?), or some obscure law professor from the
University of Tennessee. So just now you (and I!) should notice that
when I talk about "us" and "we," I mean "we racial justice
advocates: we who believe that the dismantling of the structures and
patterns of white supremacy in America has not been achieved and
who believe that something needs to be done about that fact."
The definition I just gave may in fact exclude some people in
this audience. If so, those of you who are excluded, please accept
my warm welcome as witnesses to this part of the conversation. "We
partisans" won't be the only "we" or "us" I'll talk about this
morning, because I am part of many different groupings, just as
each of you is. At this point, however, I intentionally have chosen
to talk to "us civil rights advocates." Because I am not here to try
to persuade anyone that entrenched racial hierarchy is a prominent
feature of our society, or that the vast majority of Americans stand
to gain immensely from its abandonment. I want to press on beyond
those admittedly important and sometimes contested points to pose
questions that, for me, are harder to resolve.
As we near the end of the millennium we seem to find ourselves
at what law professor Derrick Bell has called a "crossroads" in civil
rights theory and practice.' Many civil rights thinkers of many
different persuasions have observed that the civil rights crusade faces
a crisis.4 For members of many communities of color there is a crisis

2. For some earlier of my attempts at questions and non-pat answers, see
Fran Ansley, Race and the Core Curriculum in Legal Education, 79 CAL. L. REV.
1511 (1991) and Fran Ansley, Stirring the Ashes: Race, Class and the Future of

Civil Rights Scholarship, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 993 (1989).
3. Professor Bell taught a seminar at Harvard Law School entitled Civil
Rights at the Crossroads.See DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE
QUEST FOR RACIAL JUSTICE xii (1987).
4. See, e.g., Alan Freeman Racism, Rights and the Quest for Equality of
Opportunity: A Critical Legal Essay, 23 HAgv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 295 (1988);
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in living standards, in quality of life, in education, in unemployment,
and too often a crisis in survival itself.
For scholars and legal advocates there is also something of an
intellectual crisis. The tools and weapons we and our forerunners
fashioned earlier in the fight-tools like the Fourteenth Amendment
(designed to assure the rights of citizenship to the newly freed slaves),
tools like Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (designed to
assure open participation in the world of work), tools some people
gave their lives to forge, tools we sincerely hoped (and sometimes
even believed) would cause the structures of racial subordination and
domination to tumble down-these tools in many cases lie bent and
twisted at our feet. They may even be turned against us now to
block or hobble ongoing efforts to ease the racial disparities that
continue to plague our society. The very fruits of victory in some
cases seem to have become the ashes of defeat.
I want to suggest two reasons this morning why the victory of
civil rights law reform has sometimes left such a bitter aftertaste.
First, in far too many cases and places, the "victory" of even formal
equality is still yet to come. I believe it is crucial, especially for "us
white people" (please notice that I have shifted to a different "us"
at this juncture-stay alert!), to realize just how much old-style, flatout racial bigotry and unequal treatment is still with us.
Such a realization is something we will have to work at, because
in the absence of special luck or special effort, most of us whites
simply don't have equal access to adequate information on this score.
We can, of course, seek such information out, through reading and
study and movie-going and cross-race conversations and through
engaging in efforts to change things (which is often the very best
way to find out what makes those things tick), all endeavors I highly
recommend.
Sometimes, through some association with people of color, we
stumble onto information about persistent racist beliefs and disparate
treatment. I find myself remembering particular incidents here. One
is the racism my brother-in-law found among teachers at the local
high school in the district where he and his family live. This racism
never came to his attention when his two older boys, who are white,
were attending the school. It became all too evident, however, in his
dealings with the school when his third, mixed-race child came along.
I think of other incidents too. Now that we are beginning to
desegregate the profession of law teaching, for instance, we law

Walter E. Williams, The False Civil Rights Vision, 21 GA. L.

Kimberl

REV.

1119 (1987);

Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation

and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARv. L. REV. 1331 (1988); Linda

S. Greene, Race in the 21st Century: Equality Through Law?, 64 TUL. L. REV.
1515 (1990).
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professors may now hear stories-by mouth and in print-from
African-American and Latino and Asian-American colleagues. Thus,
my profession has afforded me the chance to hear, from a fellow
teacher in the Northeast, what it is like to commute two hours to
work because of her repeated inability to find suitable rental housing.
Her white peers have experienced no such problem. The dishonest
and depressingly similar conversations she has with landlord after
landlord leave their scars.
Sometimes one of my white students relates a similar window of
opportunity in his or her own life. One student who had been an
undergraduate at Ole Miss recalled inviting an African-American
friend down from Nashville for the weekend. He left the friend at
home for a couple of hours one afternoon while he went out,
returning to find his friend shaken and enraged. Apparently the
friend had made the mistake of stepping out of the apartment
momentarily for a breath of fresh air. Once outside he was accosted
and questioned exhaustively by security guards who simply couldn't
believe he might "belong" in that apartment complex. My student's
friend was angry but not surprised, whereas the student, a young
white man, had learned a brand new lesson.
I had a similar opportunity myself last summer when I made a
trip to the United States-Mexico border with a group of women
factory workers from Tennessee. We were visiting the border area
to see for ourselves what is happening in the industrial zones there
where so many United States companies are moving. Our group was
mostly Anglo, but one member of the delegation was a black woman,
and during part of our trip we traveled with a Latino man who
served as our translator. When we stopped at the border the whites
in our group watched in amazement as (1) the Latino man was
removed from our car, taken off by U.S. border guards to an
adjoining building and interrogated alone at length, (2) the black
woman was questioned extensively and with evident hostility and
distrust about her country of origin, and (3) the rest of us were
waved through without a hitch. Had we been traveling without these
special "tour guides," my guess is our impression of the border
would have been quite different.
We white people thus may have to work at obtaining information
and perspectives that others are in a position to observe and verify
on a daily basis,5 but I should not overstate the case. We probably
have access to some information on this score that people of color
often don't have: we hear the language of other whites who feel they
can "speak freely" in our presence. Again, stories from my students

5. Proofreading this text in May, 1992, I feel compelled to mention the
special kind of window created by the Rodney King videotape, though I imagine
most of my readers are well ahead of me.
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have enriched my understanding of this phenomenon. I will share
some of them in paraphrase. One told me of the comment he heard
in his fraternity: "A black can rush this fraternity; there's not really
anything we can do about that, but there will never be a black pledge
as long as there is a breath in my body." Another told me of his
aunt who is a member of management in a Fortune 500 company,
and who supervises a number of black employees. She refers to them
as "niggers" when she is home, though she must be more selfconscious about her language on the job. Others tell me stories as
well: the child in my Girl Scout troop whose father told her she will
not go to a college in a big city, because too many black people
would be there. I recall the file clerk at a former job who was
surprised I didn't know it was good luck for a white person to rub
the head of a young black child.
These and similar attitudes result in hundreds of thousands of
human decisions every day, such as decisions not to hire. (Yesterday,
Jim Douglas mentioned 6 a recent study where paired teams of identically qualified black and white job seekers tried their luck in two
urban job markets. White applicants were three times as likely to
get the jobs.7) Such attitudes result in other decisions as well: not to
rent an apartment, not to grant mortgages in a certain neighborhood,
not to promote, not to make eye contact, not to mentor, not to
These hundreds of thousands of
challenge, not to befriend ....
decisions help to weave a social fabric, a fabric where the pattern
of racial disparity is still being laid down, row by row, day by day,
generation by generation.
One reason, then, why the great victory of formal equality with
whites has not "worked" very well for African-Americans is that in
far too many cases it has never really been tried. Some aspirational
goals have been articulated, which is certainly important, and some
major inroads have been made. These strong attitudes and decisional
patterns persist, however, not as vestiges or remnants or deviant
exceptions but as part of the experience of daily life for vast numbers
of people. Even formal equality remains an abstract dream in many
contexts.
But the frequent failure to achieve formal equality is not enough
of an explanation. I think we can and should say more than this
about why the victory of civil rights reform has proven so inadequate
to the eradication of racial injustice. The problem is more complicated

6. Dean Douglas had spoken the previous afternoon, Feb. 25, 1992, on the
opening panel of the First Annual Franklin D. Cleckley Symposium, sharing with
the audience a collage of his earlier civil rights writings by way of historical and
critical analysis of present trends.
7. See Julia Lawlor & Jeffrey Potts, Job Hunt: Blacks Face More Bias,
USA TODAY, May 15, 1991, at IA.
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than simple persistent bigotry and disparate treatment. I believe that
both the underlying state of the economy and the underlying state
of the law in this country are such that even if true formal equality
were achieved tomorrow, the great bulk of African Americans would
still be in a perilous condition, and the civil rights movement would
still find itself in crisis.
Regarding the economy, I will try to keep my remarks brief.
Suffice it to say that the group of the very wealthy is growing, and
the group of the poor and near-poor is growing, but what used to
be the great group in the middle (typified by the blue collar jobs in
industry-mining, steel, auto, furniture, clothing, electronics-which
were such an important ladder for black non-professional families
into a more secure situation) is shrinking with alarming speed. We
are a deindustrializing society whose relative economic strength is in
decline. Our government policy has been harnessed to the task of
widening the gap between rich and poor, and massive social resources
have been shifted from those at the bottom of the social pyramid to
those at the top.8
As for the state of the underlying law, we have a system of
property rights and legal entitlements that results in most people
enjoying less security, fewer services, sparser social goods, and fewer
cushions against economic disaster than any other advanced industrialized country in the world. The increased pressure for the United
States to compete in the global economy will do nothing but exacerbate these tendencies.
If you are black and are not among that top 20% of all Americans
who are on the escalator going up, but instead you are part of the
bottom 800o that is losing ground, then even true no-faking-it
achievement of formal equality would yield only the
opportunity for you to stand around with a lot of other people on
a glass floor and pray it didn't break. Formal equality would not
help you to solve your most basic problems.
What I am saying is two-fold. First, we have won formal equality
in principle but continue to learn how hard it is to achieve even
formal equality in consistent practice. Second, we are forced to see
that formal equality, even if it were honored in practice, would mean
little in a society that is in deep economic trouble and that has thus
far chosen to guarantee its citizens only the barest of substantive
entitlements. Faced with this dilemma, what should "we civil rights
advocates" do?
One answer that has emerged from the civil rights movement and
from the other struggles for justice that it helped to spawn is what
I will call "identity politics." This phrase has been applied to forms

8. See, e.g., Sylvia Nasar, However You Slice the Data the Richest Did Get
Richer, N.Y. Times, May 11, 1992, at Cl.
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of organizing and forms of political discourse that stress how important it is for subordinated groups of people to mobilize themselves
around their own group identity. The recent history of reform
movements in the United States has contained a strong dose of
identity politics. The civil rights movement itself (especially in its
more nationalist manifestations), the women's movement, the gay
and lesbian movement, and the movement of the physically challenged
are all examples of identity politics at work.
I believe there are some very good and important features of
identity politics: the proud identification, study, nurture, and transmission of a group's culture can help to celebrate properly the
achievements and sacrifices of subordinated people, to preserve cultural memory, and to create environments that are conducive to
human flourishing. 9 Participation in a movement that stresses one's
identity and one's bonds with others who share that identity can
promote the self-esteem of group members and help them articulate
powerfully their concerns and experiences to the larger community.
Organizations built around identity politics can create spaces where
subordinated people experience a kind of validation, growth, and
healthy challenge that may be available to them in no other company
and in no other environment.
Further, both history and present observation show only too
clearly that certain categories of identity are drastically significant
for the distribution of power and resources (and the distribution of
powerlessness and pain) in our society. Holding up the lens of race
or gender to our world reveals startling patterns that should be
noticed and studied. A strategy based on mobilizing members of
those groups around visions revealed by those "identity lenses" would
seem to have great cogency. For these reasons and more, I view
myself as an "identity politician." I am steeped in the habits and
outlook of identity politics and believe it offers us important things
as we stand here at the crossroads.
In the case of race, racial subordination has been such a lynchpin
of our social system for so long and has been built into our lives in
so many destructive ways that I believe nothing but a color-conscious
movement (and a color-conscious jurisprudence) stands a chance of
successfully analyzing or opposing that subordination. That colorconscious movement may find itself entering into much-needed coalitions, but it will and should also find itself insisting that its coalition
partners fairly encounter and respond to the tough issues, the history,
and the insights afforded by the identity politics of race. 10

9. Margaret Radin introduced me to this evocative phrase. See Margaret
Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARv. L. REV. 1849 (1987).
10. This is why the fight to defend affirmative action is so important, for
example. It forces an examination of the problems with the ideology of "colorblind-
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I believe similar dynamics are at work around the politics of
gender. Similar needs exist for independent spaces for feminist work
and for an independent women's movement that can prod and
challenge its allies to encounter the tough issues, the history, and the
insights afforded by the identity politics of gender. I'm sure each of
you can think of other examples of groups that could benefit from
identity politics.
Dangers are involved, however, in *identity politics. Whenever
identity is an issue, for example, defining membership in the identity
group unavoidably becomes an important task. People involved in
identity politics may find themselves spending a lot of intellectual
and emotional energy on questions of who is "in" and who is "out."
Policing the boundaries can sap people's energy and tax their relationships with others, requiring a kind of "defense budget" for
"identity security" that may not be the best use of precious resources.
Related to the problem of military spending in identity politics
is the problem of categories. Like all such constructs, the categories
of contemporary United States identity politics can distort our vision
and the way we think. (The trouble is, of course, while we can't
think clearly with categories, we can't think without them either.
This paradox remains unresolved.")
One of the main distortions created by categories in this context
is that identity politics creates difficulties in coping with people who
fall into two categories at once, like people who are both black and
female. Of course, a moment's thought will reveal that all of us
human beings fall into two (and more!) categories at once. Therefore,
at least in some ways, identity politics must create difficulty in coping
with each and every one of us.
I want to draw your attention to two dynamics in particular that
I believe are problematic in the way identity politics handles multiple
categories. First, those of us who involve ourselves with identity
politics have a tendency to treat the different "identities" a person
has as somehow separable from all their other possible identities and
also from some generic humanness we all have in common. This is
the kind of thinking that leads to questions like, "Which is more
important to you, that you are black, or that you are a woman?"
I sometimes think of this as my File Drawer Problem. It has
invaded my office space in a very real way. I have one drawer in
my filing cabinet labeled "WOMEN" and another labeled "RACE."
This makes a certain amount of sense, but I run into all kinds of

ness" as it presently functions in public discourse. See Neil Gotanda, A Critique of
"Our Constitution is Color-Blind," 44 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1991).

11. I am indebted to Angela Harris for putting this difficulty in a particularly
elegant light. See Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory,
42 STAN. L. REV. 581 (1990).

1992]

CIVIL RIGHTS AGENDA

problems when I file things. Where should I put information relating
to the problems of Latina women in South Texas, for instance?
Should I create a Latina file for my WOMEN drawer or file the
information in the Latino file in my RACE drawer? If I file it in
the RACE drawer, am I not implicitly saying that the problems of
Latinas at the border are best thought of as racial? Isn't that also
inaccurate and misleading, because I know many of their problems
are directly tied to their identity as women? If I put the information
in the WOMEN drawer, am I not muting that incredibly important
part of the problems of Chicana women that springs from their
identity as brown people?
Furthermore, if I put the Latinas in my WOMEN drawer, that
leaves me with a Latino file in the RACE drawer. What am I
supposed to put there? If I put in it anything that relates to Latinos
that is not explicitly related to women, am I not giving basic humanity
to the men while reserving some special, modified, qualified, different-from-plain-old-Latin status for women? You can see I have a
real problem!
My own sense, although it is hard for me to hold onto, is that
the "gender part" of a person and the "race part" of the person
are not layers that can be thought of as separable strata. 12 A colleague
of mine 3 has suggested that perhaps we should stop thinking of
things like race and gender as separate layers stacked on each other.
She believes it may be more helpful to think of these aspects of
identity as "enzymes" that interact with other identity aspects, altering them (and being altered by them) in deeply constitutive ways.
They are transformative and interactive rather than add-ons.
While a person's identity may be multi-faceted when seen in this
way, that does not mean it is segregable. Asking someone whether
her race or her gender is more important would be like asking a
molecule of water whether its oxygen or its hydrogen is more important. One familiar with water's elements and properties would
recognize this as an incoherent question. After all, if you took away
either its oxygen or its hydrogen, you would have no water molecule
left. An African-American man is not just a generic male layered
over with a stratum of generic blackness. His race has "done something" to his gender identity, and his gender has "done something"
to his racial identity. The two form an inseparable whole.
Meanwhile, I have no idea what to do with my file drawers (or
with the related problems I find in having to run back and forth

12. It is Regina Austin I remember first articulating this for me. See, Regina
,ustin,
Sapphire Bound!, 1989 Wis. L.J. 539 (attacking "icing on the cake"
thinking).

13.
insights.

Professor Martha Mahoney to be precise, to whom I owe this and other
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between two different floors of the library when I want to browse
in the holdings on black women). I fantasize that the answer probably
lies in a Data Base somewhere in heaven, where all the information
I want to collect sits constantly suspended in a sort of humming,
never-static matrix, just waiting for me to ask it to reveal itself along
one axis or another, but always provisional, partial, perspectivedependent, and contextual. This will require further technology, I
suppose. The real problem is what to do with our minds, which tend
to operate too much like file drawers.
Those of us trying to think about, reason about, and act on
these matters of identity still are left with, and need to be aware of,
the distortions of categorization that may occur when we try to build
a civil rights vision based on identity politics. We do violence to
people's multipleness and complexity. We blind ourselves to occurrences that do not fit our categories and that are obscured when we
look at a situation with only one lens. We build walls that keep us
in our places, even in the process of protesting the injustice of our
position.
A second and related problem with categories of identity, a
problem at which I hinted when I told you about my File Drawer
Problem, is the strong tendency for each category to carry within
itself an unstated norm, and for that norm to reinforce and mirror
some of the very inequities that the civil rights movement set out to
overcome.'

4

I am afraid that last sentence may be hard to follow.

Perhaps I can best explain by giving an example.
At one point in the development of the feminist movement, white
feminists launched a campaign against rape. The idea was to tell the
story of sexual violence from a woman's point of view, to redefine
the law of rape in a way that was mindful of women's welfare, and
so on. This was a terribly important campaign. Those of us in law
and legal education are painfully aware of the shameful record of
non-enforcement, the need for reform of evidentiary practices, the
scandalously high under-reporting rate associated with this violent
and traumatizing crime, and related problems. "We law teachers"
should thank feminists for bringing these matters into the public
consciousness. I want to talk just now, however, about three things
"we white feminists" left out of our early accounts of rape:
-We did little investigation, and spoke very little, of the long and
special history of sexual abuse of black women at the hands of
white men. This is an important part of the history and dynamics

14. On this point, I especially appreciate the fine work of KimberI Crenshaw,
who has productively explored these patterns. See KimberlM Williams Crenshaw,

Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of
Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 139.
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of rape, and the early white feminist account was impoverished by
its relative absence.
-We did little investigation and spoke very little, of the racist use
of the rape charge against black men as an instrument of racist
terror during long stretches of our national history: a practice in
which white women were often complicit, and a setting in which
those women could hardly be described as the victims of a prosecutorial process biased against conviction.
-We did little investigation, and spoke very little, of the sexual
abuse of black women at the hands of black men, therefore missing
entirely an additional burden and constraint often borne by black
rape victims seeking security and redress. These victims often experience deep ambivalence about invoking law enforcement authority
against a black man because of what they know about racial politics
and about the police.
In other words, white women confidently spoke of "We women."
We announced that "we" had a whole special set of problems in
regard to rape. Upon closer examination, however, the "we" of
those initial analyses was not really "we women," it was "we white
women." The unstated norm hidden in the term "woman" was in
that case "white." Black women's experiences were left out of this
account, and the account itself suffered from a narrowness and
parochialism that weakened it for everyone. Fortunately, black feminists have been willing to take up this issue and discuss it, and they
have provoked an extremely productive reassessment, at least in many
quarters of the women's movement. 15
Another example of an unstated norm occurred in a class I teach
on race and gender matters. One day I had asked the class to
compare the events, movements, and ideologies that led to passage
of the Fifteenth Amendment with those leading to passage of the
Nineteenth Amendment. At one point in our far-ranging discussion
an African-American male student said something like, "Women
have not had to endure the sheer inhumanity that went along with
race discrimination and that we blacks have had to bear."
There are a couple of interesting things about this remark. First,
you will probably not be surprised that several women in the class
wanted to argue against the implication that "women" have not had
to bear "sheer inhumanity." Some of the oppressions experienced
because of gender are, after all, about as sheer and about as inhumane

15. Here I owe a debt to black feminists Angela Davis and Paula Giddings,
and to white feminist Elizabeth Spelman, among many others. See ANGELA Y.
DAVIS, WOMEN, RACE AND CLASS (1981); PAULA GIDDINGS, WHEN AND WHERE I
ENTER: THE IMPACT OF BLACK WOMEN ON RACE AND SEX IN AMERICA (1984);
ELIZABETH V. SPELMAN, INESSENTIAL WOMAN: PROBLEMS OF EXCLUSION IN FEMINIST
THOUGHT (1988).
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as one could imagine. Also, this question of rank-ordering oppressions can be a troubling one.
I believe the student's remark had an even more interesting
feature, however. Listen to it again: "Women have not had to endure
the sheer inhumanity that went along with race discrimination and
that we blacks have had to bear."
The clear implication of that remark is either that all "women"
are white (otherwise some of them too would have had to endure
race discrimination) or that all blacks are men (otherwise it would
be nonsensical to say that "women" as a group can be neatly
separated from "we blacks.") The result of this unconscious train
of assumptions is the erasure of black women from the mental
picture. This way of conceptualizing the problem leads both white
women and black men to assume their black sisters away. Black
women find a home in neither file drawer.
This puzzle, this utterly unintended slant in my student's language, reveals again the problem of the assumed norm. In the
category "women" as used by some feminists in the rape campaign,
the assumed norm was white. In the category "blacks" as used by
my student, the assumed norm was male. You will note that in each
case the assumed norm was that of the dominant half of a polarity:
white over black, and male over female. Thus in the very act of
claiming one's own identity, one may create another hierarchy that
suppresses or erases somebody else, especially if the commitment to
one axis of identity is strong enough to block one's ability to see
other axes that are also at work.
But that is not all. There is a third problem as well. In addition
to the problem of overconcern with boundaries that sometimes accompanies identity politics, and in addition to the difficulty identity
politics engenders in accounting for and supporting the multiple,
complex identities which people actually do have, the turn to identity
politics as a solution to the civil rights crisis can set different groups
against each other-groups who ought to be making common cause.
It can divide the large group of people whose interests lie in serious
change into warring factions resentful and distrustful of each other,
worried that any attempt to empathize with the situation of another
may threaten the sense of their own identity they have worked so
hard to build.
The foregoing discussion reveals some very real problems I perceive with identity politics despite my own position as an "identity
politician" of sorts. Now I want to argue that the structure of civil
rights law as it has evolved has promoted identity politics in ways
that sometimes have been very positive, but at other times have
produced real problems in the achievement of meaningful social
change.
Our civil rights law is centrally built around the notion of
membership in a victim group-what we call a "protected group"
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in Title VII doctrine and a "suspect class" in Fourteenth Amendment
lingo. In other words, to have a cause of action under much of our
civil rights law, one must assert a cognizable "identity," and beyond
these special categories of recognized victimhood, one has no grievance.
I first began to appreciate this situation as a limit and a contradiction in the area of employment law. When I had just begun to
work for legal services years ago, a worker came in for an interview
one day. This worker was convinced by her own astute reading of
the signs that she was about to be fired. Her supervisor had taken
a personal dislike to her, her children had been through a series of
illnesses that had caused her to miss work on several occasions, she
had recently been subjected to petty disciplinary actions when it
seemed to her that other workers were not similarly disciplined, and
her supervisor (a female) had begun criticizing her publicly in ways
that seemed both unwarranted and calculated to make her lose her
temper. I felt she was right to be concerned about losing her job.
The difficulty, however, was trying to explain to her about The
Law. She had this idea that the law would protect her against
arbitrary actions by her employer. I asked her if there was a collective
bargaining contract at her workplace-if she was represented by
union. She replied, "No" (statistically the most probable answer she
could have given, of course, here in the U.S.A. in the late twentieth
century). I asked whether she had an individual contract of some
kind. "No," she laughed (appropriately enough, because she was a
blue collar production worker). I asked whether any type of employee
manual set out the terms and conditions of her employment. No,
she said. I then had to explain that in the absence of a collective or
individual contract to the contrary, her employer could fire her for
"good cause, bad cause, or no cause at all."
At first she refused to believe me. I explained again. Then she
challenged me by reporting that her cousin had once won his job
back after he was fired. It seemed her cousin had been the only
black man in his department, and his supervisor had repeatedly given
him the dirtiest, most dangerous work. After the cousin complained
to management about his treatment, the supervisor fired him, but
through an anti-discrimination complaint he had been successful in
winning back his job. Well, she had me. I had to back up and
correct my earlier explanation. Our law was more complex than I
had originally told her. Actually an employer could fire her for good
cause, bad cause, or no cause at all, except: an employer could not
fire her because she was black. There was one particular type of bad
cause that the law had put off limits.
My client pressed on. How about the woman that her mother
knew who had gotten back pay for having been fired when she
refused to sleep with the boss? Well, I hastened to explain, that was
another type of unfairness that our law prohibited. An employer
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could not fire her because she was a woman, and the courts had
developed the view that if someone was fired because she refused to
grant sexual favors, that would count as gender discrimination. I
went on to explain some other identity groups that might be protected, and some other types of unfair treatment that might be
actionable under our anti-discrimination law.
The trouble was that the experiences of this black woman didn't
really fit a race discrimination or sex discrimination mold. We could
have probed and stretched and perhaps made out a case, but she
didn't believe her experiences resulted from race or gender animus.
She felt they were individually and personally motivated, arbitrary,
and unfair. She felt she should have some recourse and basic job
security, and she could not fathom why the law would protect her
from one type of arbitrary treatment and not from the others.
Another recent experience reminded me of the strangeness of our
anti-discrimination law. A friend of mine served last term on a grand
jury in a mid-sized Southern city. One part of that jury's job was
to tour the local jails and report on what they found. In this particular
locality there were two jails: one city and one county. One of the
jails was significantly more comfortable, less depressing, and more
spacious than the other. Recently the authorities at the city and
county had gotten together and decided to put the women prisoners
from both the city and the county together in the less desirable
location because that facility was the smaller of the two, and there
were fewer women prisoners. The impact on quality of life was, in
my friend's view, significant. What was strange for us, however, was
to think about how the law might apply to this situation. Many
times in the past prisoners had been assigned to this prison through
sex-neutral criteria. It seemed likely to my friend and me that a
complaint of sex discrimination by the grand jury could succeed in
forcing a return to some form of the old days, with a reassignment
of prisoners along sex-neutral lines. Exactly the same number of
prisoners, however, would still suffer from inadequate quarters. It
was hard to feel much victory in such an accomplishment, even
though one bad type of arbitrariness would undeniably have been
removed from the system.
One important unspoken message of much anti-discrimination
law is that our legal, social, and economic system is basically sound
and just. This law suggests there is an admitted problem with some
social behavior that deviates from this sound and just norm, behavior
that makes "arbitrary," "irrational" classifications such as those
based on racial or sexual identity. Anti-discrimination law holds out
the promise that the legal system can and will eliminate those
particular types of arbitrary and irrational deviations. The very
promise suggests its corollary, however: that beyond the "fixable"
deviations, the law will not and should not intervene.
There were and still are many arbitrary irrational classifications
based on race and sex, of course. In my view, however, even if those
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were eradicated, plenty of arbitrariness would be left. As Dr. Hooks
so wryly reminded us last night, "Most of the folks you know had
absolutely nothing to do with how they got here."'' 6 I wonder, today
in West Virginia, how we explain to ourselves who it is that gets
born to a college professor, and who to a coal miner? Who is it
that is born to a family lucky enough to have a miner at work and
who to a single mother struggling to stretch a welfare check? Who
is it that is born to a Charleston chemical company executive and
who to someone in McDowell County hoping for a job in one of
Appalachia's new industries: perhaps burying garbage shipped in
from New Jersey or guarding prisoners shipped in from Washington,
D.C.? These inequities remain untouched by American anti-discrimination law.
I want to make it clear that I am not blaming the persistence of
these non-racial, non-sexual inequities on the selfishness of identity
politicians, although those who complain that race and gender issues
are the provenance of "special interest groups," or those who oppose
affirmative action sometimes seem to suggest as much. Quite the
contrary. For example, people of color frequently have litigated to
expand the law beyond the suspect-classification, identity-politics
branch of equal protection and to strengthen the other, "nonidentity" branch of Fourteenth Amendment equality, which is rooted
in fundamental rights. Likewise they have lobbied repeatedly for
legislation that would benefit more whites than blacks, such as
increases in AFDC benefits, food stamps, and the like. Far too often
they have enjoyed far too few allies in these endeavors.
If we are searching for causes of "non-racial" problems that
beset disadvantaged groups in America, we might well conclude that
the stubborn racism of large segments of the white electorate has
been the most crucial one, a racism that has prevented those segments
from making common cause with people of color. This deep racial
divide has been a major reason why the United States lags astoundingly behind other industrialized countries in basic indices of human
welfare, such as infant mortality, universal availability of health care,
employment security, and adequate education.
So I do not blame us identity politicians for these other kinds of
inequities. But I do want to exhort us to action. Identity politicians,
and I include myself in that category, must see beyond the lens of
their own group identification.
In drawing these remarks to a close, let me suggest one way we
might start the kind of process I envision. I am searching for an
approach that would not require the discarding or transcending of
one's own identity, but rather the deepening of it. Here is my

16. Dr. Benjamin Hooks had given the keynote address for the First Annual
Franklin D. Cleckley Symposium the evening before, and had offered his reflections
on the past, present, and future of the civil rights movement.
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proposal: all of "us identity politicians" who have chosen to identify
with a social group and to engage in political activity around that
identity, should consciously and as a matter of principle consider the
perspectives, the experiences, and the political needs of those members
of our identity group who are least privileged. We should conceive
of our problems and design our reform strategies with their needs
and perspectives firmly in mind.
In other words, a woman like me (a self-identified feminist,
white, employed, presently-abled, American, heterosexual, and in a
two-parent, two-wage-earner family) needs to investigate how things
might look from the points of view of women who are, for instance,
black, brown, poor, alien, ill, single, lesbian, third-world, battered,
unemployed, or all of the above. Viewing women's problems from
those perspectives, I believe, will complicate matters but it will often
suggest fruitful answers to strategic questions. Seen from this vantage
point, for instance, the goal of helping my sister attorneys crash the
glass ceilings at their law firms seems less compelling than universal
health insurance, free day care centers, battered women's shelters,
and family leave, not to mention development of a responsible
industrial policy that aims at sustainable growth both in the United
States and for our neighbors in the South. Marilyn Yarbrough was
modeling something of this approach for us yesterday, when she
urged us to evaluate school choice plans by the standard of how
they would affect poor children of color.7
In a recent discussion about these matters with a Canadian
colleague about this way of approaching identity politics, I was
challenged to examine my own assumptions about the meanings of
privilege and disadvantage. Some First Nations people,' 8 she said,
have pointed out to her the ways in which they feel more richly
endowed than those in mainstream culture and have urged her to
rethink some of her own contrary notions. The point was a provocative one, with which I am still struggling. Nevertheless, there is
something I mean here and want to emphasize: certain groups of
women have less access to resources, fewer ways to make themselves
heard or felt by others, more chances of being marginalized as
deviant from a presumed norm, and more likelihood of suffering
material deprivations. It is these women I am suggesting "we feminists" should place at the center in our visions and strategies.
You may notice something about the implications of this approach. This conscious and explicit valuing of what some of "us
Christians" refer to as "the least of these,"' 9 this suggestion that
17.

Professor Yarbrough had delivered a talk the previous afternoon on

school choice programs and their implications for the African-American community.

18.

Some readers may not be familiar with this name for native peoples in

the Americas. It is in widespread use in Canada.

19.

Matthew 25:20.
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identity politicians should privilege the least privileged among them,
has an interesting side effect: it often suggests coalitions beyond the

original identity circle and therefore an expansion beyond the particular identity group in which the project began and in which it remains
rooted. What intrigues me is that one arrives at this point by thinking
deeply and inclusively about one's "own" group. In the case of
feminists, for example, I would argue that points of connection and
common cause with men are suggested by thinking deeply and
inclusively about the vibrant and elusive category "women".
I will close now by simply leaving it with you. These problems

and dilemmas are ours to solve. I invite you to think about your
own identity and about the categories of belonging and exclusion
that have helped to define you. I invite you to think about those
who share some aspects of your identity but not others, and to think
especially about those "at the bottom" of whatever category you
have chosen for your focus or whatever efforts and institutions in
which you find yourself. How might the world look from their

perspective? I invite you all to think about each other and about
those not here in today's circle at all. Much lies before us.
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